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INTRODUCTION
Jeremy Bloom appears to epitomize the “All-American” kid:
he was a member of his state champion high school football team,
a track star, a skiing star, and a student with a 3.4 high school
GPA. Jeremy Bloom, however, is anything but typical. His
football prowess earned him a scholarship to play at the University
of Colorado, while his skiing talents enabled him to compete for
the U.S. Olympic Team in the 2002 Olympic Winter Games
(hereinafter the “Games”) and earn the U.S. National and World
Cup championship titles in mogul skiing in the same year.1 Bloom
was also a two-time Colorado State track and field champion. His
good looks, meanwhile, have provided him with numerous
modeling and entertainment opportunities, including a lucrative
contract with Tommy Hilfiger.2 It appears, however, that these
coveted opportunities may be mutually exclusive. The National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) determined that in order
for Bloom to compete as a collegiate athlete, he must forfeit his
modeling and entertainment opportunities.3
The NCAA was established on March 31, 19064—then called
the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States—in

* J.D. expected, Fordham University School of Law, 2003; B.A., University of
Delaware, 2000.
1
See Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 11, Bloom v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (20th Dist. Ct. Colo. Aug. 15, 2002) (No. 02-CV-1249)
[hereinafter Bloom’s Complaint] (on file with the author).
2
See id. ¶ 15.
3
See id. ¶ 52.
4
See Kay Hawes, The NCAA Century Series—Part I: 1900–39: ‘Its Object Shall Be
Regulation and Supervision: NCAA Born From Need to Bridge Football and Higher
Education, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 8, 1999, at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/19991108/
active/3623n27.html.
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response to increasing safety concerns in the sport of football.5 At
that time, players did not use the padding and protective equipment
now standard for the sport.6 Several schools had banned football
and state legislatures were debating making the sport illegal, but
few changes to the game were being implemented.7 The 1905
college football season provided the necessary impetus for
sweeping change, as it resulted in eighteen deaths and 149 serious
injuries to student-athletes.8 Representatives from colleges and
universities agreed to meet and form an association, which then
made several changes to collegiate football.9 The association
issued a formal constitution and bylaws on March 31, 1906, upon
ratification by the then thirty-five member institutions.10 By 1909,
the association had expanded to sixty-seven member institutions
and the association changed its name accordingly in 1910 to the
National Collegiate Athletic Association, “to reflect its now truly
national nature.”11 By 1919, the NCAA was composed of 170
member institutions and governed eleven different sports.12
Currently, the NCAA is made up of 1,258 member institutions,
with a total of approximately 361,175 student-athletes within its
jurisdiction.13
As the membership of the NCAA has evolved, so have its
purposes. Once enacted for regulating and ensuring the safety of
football, the NCAA’s purposes have greatly expanded. The
current stated goals of the NCAA are to: “Promote student-athletes
and college sports through public awareness; [p]rotect studentathletes through standards of fairness and integrity; [p]repare
student-athletes for lifetime leadership; [and p]rovide student-

5

See id.
See id.
7
See id.
8
See id.
9
See id.
10
See id.
11
Id.
12
See id.
13
See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n [NCAA], Composition of the NCAA, at
http://www1.ncaa.org/membership/membership_svcs/membership_breakdown.html
(Mar. 4, 2003).
6
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athletes and college sports with the funding to help meet these
goals.”14
Approximately fifty years after its original formation, the 1940
NCAA convention “authorized the NCAA Executive Committee to
investigate alleged violations of the NCAA’s amateurism
regulations and to issue interpretations of the NCAA
constitution.”15 The issue of amateurism, however, has been
present since the NCAA’s establishment.16 Scholars indicate that
amateurism’s historical roots can be traced back to Great Britain
and reflect the socio-economic classes of that time.17 Amateurism
was associated with the privileged classes—those who engaged in
sport “purely for enjoyment and to become well-rounded
gentlemen.”18 The NCAA addressed the notion of amateurism in
its original 1906 constitution, where eligibility of student-athletes
was contingent upon the student-athlete having not, at any time,
received money or other consideration for his or her athletic
endeavors.19 The eligibility rules at this time, however, operated
solely on an honor system, since the NCAA had no mechanism for
enforcing its rules.20
By the 1900s, the emerging popularity of professional baseball
inspired the NCAA’s first debate over amateurism. Many believed
“that simply by associating with professionals, . . . student-athletes
had forfeited their amateur status and their college eligibility.”21
By 1916, the NCAA specifically defined amateurism in its
bylaws.22 The definition stated, “An amateur athlete is one who
participates in competitive physical sports only for the pleasure
and the physical, mental, moral and social benefits directly derived
14

NCAA, The Purposes of the NCAA, NCAA Online, at http://www.ncaa.org/about/
purposes.html (n.d.).
15
NCAA, Timeline—1940 to 1979, NCAA News, at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/
19991122/active/3624n27.html (Nov. 22, 1999).
16
See Kay Hawes, Debate on Amateurism Has Evolved Over Time, NCAA News, at
http://www.ncaa.org/news/2000/20000103/active/3701n03.html (Jan. 3, 2000).
17
See id.
18
Id.
19
See id.
20
See id.
21
Id.
22
See id.
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therefrom.”23 National enforcement of the eligibility rules became
feasible once the NCAA Committee on Infractions was established
in 1954.24 The rules, however, underwent changes over the next
twenty years. The NCAA received a number of requests from
student-athletes and their schools for waivers to maintain collegiate
eligibility.25 The waivers were “consistently denied” until the rules
were modified during the 1974 NCAA Convention.26 These
changes allowed student-athletes to compete as a professional in
one sport, while retaining their amateur status in another.
Article 12 of the NCAA’s bylaws currently governs studentathlete eligibility as it pertains to amateurism.27 Article 12 states:
“Only an amateur student-athlete is eligible for intercollegiate
athletics participation in a particular sport.”28 Article 12 then
continues to provide relevant definitions, explaining how an athlete
may lose his eligibility to play college athletics.29
Jeremy Bloom’s case presents a clear example of the conflict
arising between the NCAA’s Amateurism Bylaws (hereinafter
“Bylaws”),30 their current application, and the NCAA’s stated
purpose: betterment of its student athletes. The Bylaws’ effect on
this exemplary athlete’s career demonstrates that the Bylaws may,
in many cases, act to the detriment of student-athletes, rather than
to their benefit.
This Note contends that the regulations imposed by the NCAA,
as they relate to its student-athletes’ abilities to garner
endorsements and sponsorships, should be invalidated. Part I of
this Note will trace the decision of the District Court in Boulder
County, Colorado, refusing to enjoin the NCAA and requiring
Bloom to choose between collegiate football and his skiing career.
23

Id.
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
See, e.g., NCAA, NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 12, at 69–83 (2002–03) (setting
forth the bylaws concerning amateurism for Division I, which is the same for Divisions
II, & III), http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/division_i_manual/2002-03/index.
html.
28
Id. art. 12.01.1, at 69.
29
Id. art. 12, at 69–83.
30
Id.
24
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Part II will demonstrate that the NCAA did, in fact, breach its
contract with its member-institutions as it applies to Bloom. Part
III will examine the enforceability of the NCAA’s rules and
regulations as they apply to an athlete’s right of publicity,
concluding that these rules are unconscionable. Part IV will
demonstrate that the NCAA’s Bylaw 12.5 is an unreasonable
restraint of trade and should be invalidated. Part V recommends
several proposals that could be implemented providing ample
protection to student-athletes while preserving the amateur
environment the NCAA wishes to maintain.
I.

BLOOM V. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION31

A. Background
Bloom was awarded a scholarship to play football for the
University of Colorado in 2001, but chose to defer his admission to
prepare for the 2002 Winter Olympics.32 After his success in the
Games, Bloom sought to pursue his education and his opportunity
to play football at the University of Colorado, yet declined his
scholarship.33 The University of Colorado filed an initial waiver34
in February 2002, announcing its support of Bloom in his
entertainment and ski-related endeavors.35 This waiver was denied
by the NCAA.36 Bloom, with the support of University of
Colorado, then brought suit against the NCAA, seeking an
injunction which would allow Bloom to play for the University of
Colorado while continuing to accept his sponsorship money.37 The
31

Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 02-CV-1249 (20th Dist. Ct. Colo.
Aug. 15, 2002).
32
See Adam Thompson, Bloom Sues NCAA; Skier Wants to Play for Buffs, DENVER
POST, July 26, 2002, at D-02.
33
See id. (“[Jeremy] wants to play for the University of Colorado in the fall without a
scholarship . . . .”). See also Bloom’s Complaint ¶ 17 (“[Jeremy] will receive no financial
aid from the NCAA . . . or from any other member institution to attend CU.”).
34
See NCAA, supra note 27, art. 14.12, at 164 (describing the process under which a
member-institution may appeal when one of their student-athletes is deemed ineligible
for collegiate competition).
35
See Bloom’s Complaint ¶ 3.
36
See Thompson, supra note 32.
37
See Bloom’s Complaint ¶ 3–4.
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complaint contended that the opportunities presented to Bloom had
nothing to do with his football talents and these opportunities
preexisted his status as a collegiate athlete.38 As University of
Colorado’s assistant compliance director, Sherri McKelvey,
articulated, “[Bloom] has had these offers before he even set foot
on campus, before he’s caught his first football at [the University
of Colorado]—even in practice.”39
B. The Impact of the NCAA’s Bylaws
1. Ski Endorsements
The NCAA’s Bylaws mandate that an athlete be an “amateur,”
and although enforcement of the rules has become more flexible,
the rules prohibit athletes from being paid to promote commercial
products or services.40 Athletes have been permitted to maintain
“amateur” status in one sport while competing professionally in
another, but they are still bound to abide by the prohibition on
sponsorship, presenting a problem for those athletes whose
“secondary” sport is not a traditional professional sport.41
The NCAA allows student-athletes to play professional
sports, even minor-league baseball in the summer and then
return to their college teams in the fall and spring—as long
as the only money they accept is from their stated salary.
The NCAA has ruled in Bloom’s case that since he
doesn’t receive a salary, his endorsement deals and prize
money violate the provision that he can’t make money
based on his athletic ability.42

38

See id. ¶ 3.
B.G. Brooks, Bloom Wants Ruling: Motion Seeks to Clear Up Eligibility for CU
Football, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Colo.), July 26, 2002, at 1C.
40
NCAA, supra note 27. See also Hawes, supra note 16.
41
Thompson, supra note 32 (“[Athletes] may get paid to play professional sports and
remain eligible for others as amateurs, but cannot sign sponsorship deals that fund
participation in individual sports, such as freestyle skiing.”).
42
Shane McCammon, The Straight Line: Trouble with NCAA Unfairly Continues to
Bloom, Media News, at http://www.jeremybloom.com/ncaa.htm (July 29, 2002).
39
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If he was receiving a salary in a traditional form for his skiing
career, the NCAA would likely not resist Bloom’s pursuit of both
professional skiing and collegiate football.43 However, elitecaliber skiers do not make a traditional salary, but are instead
compensated in the form of endorsements.44 Moreover, these
endorsements do not serve as mere compensation, but often enable
the athlete to continue to participate in the burdensomely
expensive sport.
Skiers, who earn little prize money, rely on endorsements
to finance the high costs of travel and training (up to
$100,000 a year) that come with elite-level competition . . .
Bloom must give up a six-figure endorsement income by
cutting his ties with Oakley, Under Armour and others.
He’ll now be hard-pressed to fund his 2003 World Cup
campaign.45
Bloom, whose success on the ski slopes has earned him
numerous endorsements, including contracts with Oakley,46 Under
Armour,47 and Dynastar skis,48 lamented the limitations placed on
him by the NCAA ruling: “The bottom line is I just want to ski and
have a shot at Italy in 2006 and play football. This is about me
being able to pay for my [ski] season and I can’t do that without
my endorsements.”49
43

See NCAA, supra note 27, art. 12.1.2, at 73–74; McCammon, supra note 42.
See John Romano, NCAA Should Make Common Sense an Option, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES (Fla.), Aug. 21, 2002, at 1C (“The only way [Bloom] can financially support his
skiing career—the cost of equipment, coaching and traveling—is by accepting
endorsement money. By denying Bloom the type of earnings made by every Olympiccaliber skier, the NCAA is essentially threatening his career.”).
45
Kelley King, Cashing Out; Jeremy Bloom Wanted To Play for Colorado So Badly
That He Gave Up Lucrative Skiing Endorsements, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 23, 2002,
at R6.
46
See http://www.oakley.com (n.d.).
47
See http://www.underarmour.com (n.d.). Under Armour is producer of six apparelproduct lines designed to be usable in all climates and weather conditions. Their first,
and most popular product, is a lightweight synthetic undershirt, worn under the athlete’s
uniform and equipment to keep moisture away from the body. Id.
48
See http://www.dynastar.com (n.d.).
49
Bruce Feldman, Bloom: I Feel Like I’m Fighting for My Freedom, ESPN: THE
MAGAZINE, Aug. 1, 2002 (alteration in original), http://espn.go.com/ncf/news/2002/0801/
1412906.html.
44
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2. Entertainment and Modeling Opportunities
Likewise, the NCAA’s restrictions on association with a
commercial product will impair Bloom’s ability to continue to
pursue entertainment and modeling opportunities. NCAA Bylaw
12.5.2 prohibits athletes from granting the use of their name and
likeness for a commercial product, even if the athlete is
uncompensated.50 For example, the NCAA has previously found
that an athlete’s allowance of a sorority to use his picture in a
charity calendar and an athlete taking a part in a movie thriller
would both violate this Bylaw.51 Bloom was subject to an
exclusive modeling contract with Tommy Hilfiger, has appeared in
segments on television shows including EXTRA, Access
Hollywood, and on the Music Television Station (MTV), and was
offered a contract to host a show on Nickelodeon.52 According to
the NCAA’s interpretation of its rules, student-athletes are not
permitted to pursue these opportunities. Thus, this prohibition may
mean that Bloom must permanently forfeit these lucrative
opportunities.53 As Conan Smith, a William Morris talent agent,
stated, these limitations would “‘make it virtually impossible [for
Bloom] to further his career in the television and film industries at
this time.”54 The entertainment industry is notorious for its

50

See NCAA, supra note 27, art. 12.5.2, at 81.
See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS & THE LAW 734–35 (2d ed.
1998). “[I]n 1985, Steve Alford, star guard of Indiana’s NCAA champion basketball
team . . . , was suspended for one game that season because he had allowed his
photograph to be included on a calendar that was sold for charity by a school sorority.”
Id. The NCAA also determined that Darnell Autry’s acceptance of an offer for a part in a
supernatural movie thriller would violate “Bylaw 12.5.2.3.4 which states that ‘the
individual performance of a student-athlete may not be used in a commercial
movie . . .’.” Id. at 735. “Before the trial, though, the [NCAA]’s Eligibility Committee
granted Autry a special waiver on the basis that as a theater major in college, his
appearance in the film was something that many theater majors might do, and thus not
related to his athletic ability.” Id.
52
See Bloom’s Complaint ¶ 14.
53
See Bloom’s Complaint ¶ 18.
54
Jeremy Bloom’s Verified Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and for
Preliminary Injunction at 3, Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 02-CV-1249
(20th Dist. Ct. Colo. Aug. 15, 2002).
51
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fluctuations in interest. If Bloom is unable to capitalize on his
current popularity, his opportunities may be forever forsaken.55
Bloom may be further harmed considering that while at the
University of Colorado, he plans to pursue a degree in
communications.56 The school encourages their students to seek
“hands-on” opportunities such as those presented to Bloom.
Stephen B. Jones, Assistant Dean of the School of Journalism and
Mass Communications at the University of Colorado, explained
that the school “‘encourage[s] all’ its students ‘to gain professional
broadcast experience.’”57 Dean Jones explained that the university
encourages its students to gain media experience and noted that
such experience is helpful to a student seeking admittance into the
University of Colorado’s competitive communications program.58
Dean Jones further stated that media experience, such as the
Nickelodeon and MTV opportunities presented to Bloom, would
be advantageous to an individual seeking a career in broadcasting
upon graduation, concluding that, “[t]he profession will hire the
recent graduate with experience over other graduates every
time . . . .”59 While Bloom’s athletic abilities have permitted him
to fulfill his dream of playing collegiate football, the NCAA’s
restrictions are unfairly impairing his ability to make the most of
his education and fulfill his ultimate career.
Furthermore, Bloom’s status as a communications major
should have enabled him to prove his broadcasting abilities. By
analogy, Darnell Autry, a Northwestern football player and theater
major was permitted to accept a part in a commercial movie.60
Darnell Autry was a star running back, Heisman finalist, and
theater major at Northwestern University.61 In 1996, Autry sued
the NCAA to allow him to accept “a small speaking role in ‘The
Eighteenth Angel,’ a supernatural thriller being filmed in Italy,”
55

See id. at 5–6 (Entertainment and modeling opportunities “occur but once in a
lifetime, with nothing to suggest they will be available four (or five) years from now.”).
56
See Bloom’s Complaint ¶ 41.
57
Id. (alteration in original).
58
See id.
59
Id.
60
See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51.
61
See Andrew Fegelman, Judge’s Restraining Order Still Doesn’t Solve Autry’s
Problem, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 4, 1996, at 3N.
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while maintaining his eligibility to play football.62 Autry was
offered the part after the director saw him on television, and noted
the student-athlete’s “poise, presence, projection[,] and
demeanor.”63 The only compensation Autry was to receive would
be that necessary to cover his expenses.64 Further, the director
promised that the role would not include any football-related
performances by Autry, the student would not appear as an athlete
in the movie, and he would not be used to promote the film.65 The
Illinois District Court granted a temporary restraining order against
the NCAA, enjoining it from precluding Autry’s performance in
the film.66
Similarly, the broadcasting and modeling opportunities
presented to Bloom would not involve his performing as a football
athlete. In fact, these opportunities were a direct result of his
skiing success and not football. Moreover, Bloom seeks to retain
his amateur status in football. The triggering force for the offer
should not be problematic as long as the opportunities do not arise
from his success on the football field. These opportunities may be
distinguished from his participation on the University of Colorado
football team.
As Bloom has indicated, however, these
impediments are minor, he simply wants to continue to ski for his
country and play football for the University of Colorado.67
C. The Court Decision
While expressing his disappointment with the NCAA and his
sympathy for Bloom, Judge Hale, the presiding Boulder County
District Court judge, rejected Bloom’s motion for injunctive relief,

62

Mark Brown, Autry Sues NCAA Over Film Role, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, at

108.
63

Id.
See Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 02-CV-1249, slip op. at 5 (20th
Dist. Ct. Colo. Aug. 15, 2002); Brown, supra note 62.
65
See Brown, supra note 62.
66
See Jeremy Bloom’s Verified Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and for
Preliminary Injunction at 11, Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 02-CV-1249
(20th Dist. Ct. Colo. Aug. 15, 2002) (citing Autry v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No.
96CH3275 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. Apr. 3, 1996)) (on file with the author).
67
See Feldman, supra note 49.
64
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upholding the NCAA ruling.68 Recognizing the NCAA’s authority
regarding this matter, Judge Hale nevertheless expressed his
opinion that this was an unreasonable result:
Here the NCAA had an opportunity to recognize and
support a World Cup champion and an Olympic competitor
by supporting his future success—by leaving doors open
rather than closing them. . . . Mr. Bloom is truly an
amateur athlete in football with only dreams of even
receiving playing time . . . . [T]he NCAA is missing an
opportunity to promote amateurism on the one hand, and
the opportunity to support the personal and football [and]
non-athletic growth of a student athlete on the other.
Mr. Bloom is the epitome of an amateur who wishes to
live out his dream of playing college football for [the
University of Colorado] without abandoning the once-in-alifetime future opportunities he has. I would like to [see
him] live out those dreams. I would like to be able to find a
legal basis for me to be able to enjoin the NCAA.
However, I cannot find a sound legal basis that would
allow me to [do so].69
In refusing to grant an injunction against the NCAA, Judge
Hale held that the rules were rationally related to the NCAA’s
stated purposes and that they were not arbitrarily or capriciously
applied.70
First, Judge Hale determined that student athletes, specifically
Jeremy Bloom, are third party beneficiaries in the existing contract

68
See Bloom, slip op. at 7 (“Although the administrative process relating to this rule
could have, and I think should have, allowed an accommodation to be reached as to Mr.
Bloom’s interest and the interest of the NCAA, the failure to do so was not arbitrary and
capricious.”).
69
Id.
70
See id. Courts generally exert deference to the NCAA’s rules and administrative
decisions. See, e.g., Wiley v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 612 F.2d 473, 479 (10th
Cir. 1978) (“[C]onstitutional analysis requires broad discretion be given to the NCAA
eligibility rules. But even applying a minimal test of rationality the NCAA’s rule . . .
fails.”) (citation omitted).
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between the NCAA and its member collegiate institutions.71
Applying the criteria set forth in R.N. Robinson and Sons v.
Ground Improvement Techniques,72 the judge found that “the
NCAA and its members intended to benefit the person not a party
to the contract and that the benefit is direct and not merely
incidental to the contract . . . . The ways in which the contract
benefits student athletes are too numerous to mention.”73 The
bylaws constituting part of the contract were, in fact, enacted
primarily for the benefit of students.74
Judge Hale then found that without the injunction, Bloom
would be subject to immediate and irreparable harm with no
adequate legal remedy.75 In addition, preserving the status quo
would protect Bloom’s existing rights and the remedies that he
seeks.76 The judge, however, did not find that Bloom had a
probability of success on the merits of his case.77 To succeed in
his motion for injunctive relief, Bloom was required to
demonstrate that the “NCAA had breached the contract, that the
bylaws were arbitrary and capricious or in violation of public
policy, or that the bylaws were applied in an unfair, arbitrary or

71
Bloom, slip op. at 2. The NCAA conceded that this contract resulted from its
constitution and bylaws. Id.
72
31 F. Supp. 2d 881, 887 (D. Colo. 1998) (“[A] third party beneficiary . . . may have a
right to sue on the contract where ‘(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an
obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or (b) the circumstances
indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised
performance.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981))).
73
Bloom, slip op. at 2.
74
Id.
[The] series of by-laws is almost solely for the benefit of the student athlete as
it relates to a primary purpose of the contract—the education of student
athletes. Additionally the by-laws restrict the use of agents and prohibit
compensation for participation in college sports. One benefit is to foster
amateurism. The other is a direct benefit to student athletes which is to avoid
their being exploited.
Id.
75
Id. at 3.
76
Id. (“[W]ithout the injunctive relief requested Mr. Bloom will lose an opportunity to
defend his world cup title in free style mogul skiing. He will be unable to obtain the
customary income from professional skiing necessary to allow for activities such as
coaching and other expenses to allow for a defense of his title.”).
77
Id. at 3–4.
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capricious manner.”78 The judge found that Bloom failed on this
account, specifically noting the NCAA’s legitimate purpose of
fostering amateurism in collegiate sports and that the implemented
Bylaws were rationally related to the NCAA’s mission of
distinguishing collegiate athletics from professional sports.79
Further, the judge determined that the NCAA was not applying
its rules in an arbitrary or capricious manner. The judge noted that
there were differences between the pursuit of a professional career
as a skier as opposed to a baseball player, and the difference
between these salary structures justifies different treatment.80
Judge Hale noted that while some athletes would use the
sponsorship pay to fund their athletic endeavors, others would
simply take it as a profit:
If Mr. Bloom was allowed to receive the income that is
customary for professional skiers, it is not difficult to
imagine that some in other professional sports would
decide that in addition to direct monetary compensation,
that endorsements or promotion of goods would become
“customary.” Therefore, I find a rational basis for the
bylaw and its interpretation.81
Under similar reasoning, Judge Hale found that the NCAA’s
prohibition on Bloom continuing his Tommy Hilfiger modeling
contract was also rational. The judge observed that the NCAA
expressed a reasonable fear that the personal appearances required
of Bloom under his contract could utilize his football ability:
If those at a Tommy Hilfiger promotion recognized or
learned that Mr. Bloom was a [University of Colorado]
football player and began discussing a dazzling punt return
he made for [a] touchdown with him, it is inconceivable
that this polite young man could reasonably be expected to
ignore the conversation. It would be a conversation about
his athleticism in football. Even if Mr. Bloom had no
intent to endorse or promote Tommy Hilfiger clothing, that
78
79
80
81

Id. at 4.
See id.
See id. at 5.
Id.
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would be a practical effect of his presence at the
promotion.82
Judge Hale also disagreed with Bloom’s argument that the
NCAA and its member institutions’ advertising and promotion
policy contravenes their stated purpose, because the policy does in
fact benefit the sports programs and “each student athlete at the
institution.”83 Further, the judge distinguished NCAA’s waiver of
Bylaw 12.5.2.3.4 for Darrell Autry from the NCAA’s refusal to
grant permission to Bloom.84
Judge Hale concluded that Bloom was unable to demonstrate
his likelihood of success and refused to issue the injunction.
Jeremy Bloom thus “faced a choice. Give up a life-long dream of
college football or give up hundreds of thousands of dollars and,
quite possibly, a chance at returning to the Olympics in 2006.
Bloom chose football.”85
While Bloom enjoyed success in his freshman season at the
University of Colorado, he remains forced to contemplate the
wisdom of his decision.86 In a recent interview, Bloom was asked
whether he planned on playing another three years of college
football, to which he responded:
I’m not sure right now. I’m just taking everything a day
at a time and after ski season I will think about if I will
come back next year or not. The NCAA makes it really
82
83
84

Id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
Id. The court noted:
Autry was a drama major well into his course of study; Autry was not being
compensated for appearing in the film; Autry had a defined and very small role
in the film; and the other actors had an international reputation which
demonstrated that the appearance of Autry in the film was not designed to
impact the popularity of the film. On the other hand, Mr. Bloom would be the
focus, the star, of any MTV or Nickelodeon show and would be compensated.

Id.
85

Romano, supra note 44.
In the Big 12 Championship Game, while losing to the University of Oklahoma,
Bloom made an 80-yard punt return, setting a Big 12 record. Bloom was also voted by
the Colorado Hall of Fame Committee as the “Colorado Amateur Athlete of the Year.”
See http://www.jeremybloom.com/index1.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2002); University of
Colorado, Oklahoma vs. Colorado (Dec. 7, 2002), at http://cubuffs.ocsn.com/sports/mfootbl/stats/120702aaa.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2003).
86

8 - FREEDMAN FORMAT

688

4/15/03 10:05 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13: 673

hard for me to be able to do both sports so at some point I
will have to choose.87
Bloom chose to play football rather than cash in on the
lucrative opportunities presented to him, but the NCAA unfairly
presented him with a choice that he never should have been forced
to make.
II.

THE CONTRACT—NCAA CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS

A. NCAA Constitution and the Bylaws
The NCAA’s Constitution and Bylaws constitute a contract
between the NCAA and its member colleges.88 Article I of the
NCAA Constitution sets forth its fundamental purposes.89 Article
1.3 states the NCAA’s “Fundamental Policy,” indicating that its
basic purpose is to “maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral
part of the educational program . . . and . . . retain a clear line of
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports.”90 The constitution establishes obligations for its member
institutions.91 Article 2.2 delegates the responsibility to member
institutions to ensure that they “maintain an environment in which
a student-athlete’s activities are conducted as an integral part of the
student-athlete’s educational experience.”92 Bylaw 12 states that
only amateur athletes are eligible to participate in NCAA
intercollegiate athletics.93 Bylaw 12 also establishes the numerous
ways in which an athlete may lose their amateur status, describing

87

Interview with Jeremy Bloom (Dec. 8, 2002), at http://www.geocities.com/
jellyqueens/jeremy/images/inter/inter.htm. See also Sam Adams, Upchurch Honored to
Join Class of 2003, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Colo.), Dec. 4, 2002.
88
See Bloom, slip op. at 2 (“The NCAA has conceded its Constitution and By-Laws
constitute a contract between it and its members which number approximately 1,267.”).
89
NCAA, supra note 27, art. 1, at 1.
90
See id. art. 1, 1.3.1, at 1.
91
See id. art. 1, 1.3.2, at 1 (“Member institutions shall be obligated to apply and
enforce this legislation, and the enforcement procedures of the Association shall be
applied to an institution when it fails to fulfill this obligation.”).
92
Id. art. 2.2.1, at 3.
93
See id., art. 12.01.1, at 69.
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prohibited forms of payment to student-athletes.94 Importantly,
Bylaw 12.5.1.1 provides that a member institution may grant
permission to entities to utilize student-athletes’ names, pictures, or
appearances if all monies derived therefrom go to the member
institution; otherwise, no form of the athlete’s identity may be
associated with any commercial product or branding.95
B. Athletes As Third-Party Beneficiaries
Judge Hale determined that Bloom was a third-party
beneficiary of the contract between the NCAA and the University
of Colorado.96 A third-party beneficiary is one who receives the
benefit of two contracting parties’ exchange of promises.97 A
typical third-party beneficiary contract exists when the promisor’s
interest in the third party is limited to the promisor’s performance
of its promise to the third party.98
[O]ne does not qualify as a third-party beneficiary of a
contract merely because one is an incidental beneficiary of
the performance of a contract or because the promisor had a
general desire to advance the interests of a third party. . . .
“[T]he key is not whether the contracting parties had an
altruistic motive or desire to benefit the third party, but
rather ‘whether performance under the contract would
necessarily and directly benefit’ that party.”99
The contract formed by the NCAA Constitution and Bylaws is
between the NCAA and its member institutions. The contract
establishes the rules and conditions to which student-athletes must
adhere in order to retain their eligibility and participate in NCAA
94

See id. art. 12, at 69–83.
See id. art. 12.5.1.1, 12.5.1.1(c), (e), (g), at 78.
96
See Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 02-CV-1249, slip op. at 2 (20th
Dist. Ct. Colo. Aug. 15, 2002).
97
See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 349 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[If] A
promises to pay B money, in exchange for which B promises to provide services to C, the
person who receives the benefit of the exchange promises between the two others (C) is
called a third-party beneficiary.”).
98
See, e.g., Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 495 (1960).
99
Hairston v. Pac.-10 Conference, 893 F. Supp. 1485, 1494 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(quoting Postlewait Constr. v. Great Am. Ins., 720 P.2d 805, 806–07 (Wash. 1986)
(quoting Lonsdale v. Chesterfield, 662 P.2d 385, 390 (Wash. 1983))).
95
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competitions.100 While student-athletes do not directly enter into
this contract, they may nonetheless be considered a party to the
agreement.101 Student-athletes are not merely affected by the
contractual performance of the two parties, but directly benefit
from the existing contract. As Judge Hale indicated: “[T]his series
of by-laws is almost solely for the benefit of the student[-]athlete
as it relates to the primary purpose of the contract—the education
of student[-]athletes.”102 Further, even the amateurism rules, while
enacted to foster amateurism itself, also have “direct benefit to
student athletes which is to avoid their being exploited.”103 Thus,
the contract’s goal is to benefit the student-athlete, as third-party
beneficiaries. Therefore, Bloom is a third party beneficiary to the
contract between the NCAA and the University of Colorado.
C. Breach
Bloom, as a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the
NCAA and the University of Colorado, has proper standing to
bring legal action against the NCAA and the University of
Colorado for those injuries he sustained as a result of those parties’
breach of contract. A third-party beneficiary has standing to sue a
party in privity to a contract for that party’s breach of the contract,
to the extent that the breach has infringed upon the rights assigned
to the beneficiary.104 The NCAA’s refusal to allow Bloom to
capitalize upon his professional opportunities constitutes a breach
of contract. The NCAA’s stated purpose and underlying rationale
for all of their rules and regulations is to enhance the educational
experience of the student-athlete.105
100

See Bloom, slip op. at 4.
Id. at 2.
102
Id.
103
Id. See also Hall v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 985 F. Supp. 782, 797 n.32 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (“NCAA members, pursuant to the constitution, bylaws and regulations, all
agree that students will not be allowed to play intercollegiate sports unless they meet
NCAA criteria. . . . [T]he intent of the NCAA and its members in evaluating incoming
student athletes . . . is to specifically protect entering student athletes . . . .”).
104
See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1961) (finding that a third party
beneficiary has a right to bring action under a contract upon a showing that the promisor
(member institutions) understood the promisee’s (NCAA’s) intent to benefit that
individual).
105
See NCAA, supra note 14.
101
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Rather than enhance Bloom’s educational experience at the
University of Colorado, however, the NCAA hampered it. As
previously stated, many of the opportunities presented to Bloom,
specifically the broadcasting opportunities, would have
supplemented the communications major’s education.106 The
NCAA’s expressed concern is that the companies approaching
Bloom with lucrative offers may exploit him.
Bloom’s
professional career predates his matriculation at the University of
Colorado. Thus, it is unlikely that Bloom would suddenly become
exploited as an NCAA athlete. The restriction did not serve to
protect Bloom, but rather thwarted viable opportunities. This may
constitute a breach of the NCAA’s promise to protect the studentathlete and enrich his education. To the extent that the NCAA’s
enforcement of its amateurism rules has impeded Bloom’s ability
to enhance his collegiate education, the NCAA breached its
contract with the University of Colorado. Bloom, a student-athlete
and third-party beneficiary to the contract, has standing to sue
based on that breach.
III.

ATHLETE LIKENESS AND COLLEGE PROFITS

As previously noted, an athlete must agree to abide by all of
the NCAA’s rules and regulations before he or she can compete.107
This provision results in depriving athletes of their ability to
capitalize upon their right of publicity. The right of publicity is the
right of an individual to control the commercial use of his or her
identity.108 The underlying rationale is that an individual’s identity
inherently belongs to him or her and that only he or she should be
able to exploit that identity so as to not provide unjust enrichment
to another.109 Here, Bloom only hopes to exploit his identity to
106

See supra Part I.B.2.
In accordance with Bylaw 14.01.3.1, a student-athlete’s eligibility hinges on the
individual adhering to the amateurism regulations set forth in Bylaw 12. NCAA, supra
note 27, arts. 14.01.3.1, at 125. Bylaw 12.1.1 describes those situations in which an
athlete would lose her amateur status. Id. art. 12.1.1, at 70–74.
108
See HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW 313–16 (1999).
109
See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 15–16 (4th ed. 1998) (“[E]very
man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself. The
labor of his body, and the work of his hands . . . are properly his.” (paraphrasing JOHN
107
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sustain himself in elite skiing. Moreover, while the NCAA rules
are not only limiting his ability to exercise this right, the NCAA
and the University of Colorado are using his identity for their own
benefit. The rules providing for this assignment of the athletes’
rights of publicity are unconscionable, and should therefore be
invalidated.
A. The Right of Publicity
The right of publicity is rooted in the right to privacy, a right
“that allowed people to block the use of their name and likeness in
advertisements without their consent.”110 Judge Jerome Frank, in
Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum,111 recognized that an
individual’s identity was a common law property right with a
commercial value completely independent of privacy concerns.112
This right might be called a “right of publicity.” For it is
common knowledge that many prominent persons
(especially actors and ballplayers), far from having their
feelings bruised through public exposure of their
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer
received money for authorizing advertisements,
popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers,
magazines, busses, trains and subways. This right of
publicity would usually yield them no money unless it
could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which
barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.113
The right of publicity is most often associated with the
commercial use of an individual’s name or likeness. The
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition takes an expansive
view of the right, defining the right of publicity as the
appropriation of “the commercial value of a person’s identity by
using without consent the person’s name, likeness or other indicia

LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. 2, ch. 5 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690))).
110
WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 422.
111
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
112
See id. at 868.
113
Id.
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of identity for purposes of trade.”114 The latter part of this
definition, the “other indicia of identity,” has allowed for
protection of various characteristics of an individual. Viable
publicity claims may be based on the misappropriation of an
individual’s likeness,115 voice,116 running style,117 an athlete’s
specialized shot or technique,118 and depictions of objects
associated with the individual.119
Bloom is prevented from exploiting any attributes of his name
or identifiable persona and from using his publicity rights to create
an association with commercial brands or products.120 The same
rule that prevents Bloom from usurping value from his name,
however, allows the NCAA, and specifically, the University of
Colorado, to exploit his personal characteristics to reap a profit.121
A. Collegiate Usage of Athlete’s Name and Likeness
An estimate in the late 1980s found that “each additional
victory in football earned the school $300,000, and in men’s
basketball $45,000. . . . Patrick Ewing is estimated to have
114

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding a violation of
Muhammad Ali’s right of publicity for a portrait in Playgirl magazine in which the
drawing clearly had a resemblance to Ali and included a reference to the drawing as
being “The Greatest”); White v. Samsung Elec. Am., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992)
(identifying a potential publicity claim for Vanna White for Samsung’s use of a robot
dressed in a wig, gown, and jewelry reminiscent of White).
116
See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding Bette
Midler’s voice is distinctive and personal, an attribute of Midler’s identity that may be
protected from commercial exploitation).
117
See, e.g., Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson, 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979) (holding that
defendant-company’s use of the name “Crazylegs” to market their shaving gel constituted
an infringement of Hirsh’s right of publicity since Elroy Hirsch’s distinctive running style
led to him being known as “Crazylegs”).
118
See generally ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 844 (2d ed. 2000) (identifying moves such as “Monica Seles’ twohanded backhand shot in tennis; Bob Cousy’s behind the back basketball pass; [and] Pete
Rose’s headfirst baseball slide” may be protectable attributes of the athletes’ rights of
publicity).
119
See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974)
(finding that a company that used a car for commercial use, which was reflective of
famous race-car driver’s distinctive car, infringed the driver’s right of publicity).
120
See NCAA, supra note 27, art. 12.5.1.1(g), at 78.
121
See id., art. 12.5.1.1(e), at 78.
115
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generated $12 million in additional revenues for Georgetown
during his four years there in the early 1980s, when overall college
basketball revenues were significantly lower than they are
today.”122 Recent years have displayed a demonstrative increase in
the amount of revenues generated for NCAA member institutions
from television and sponsorship contracts.123 Notably, the above
stated figures, attributing revenue to individual players, were
calculated before these types of lucrative contracts became the
norm.
In 1999, the NCAA and CBS signed a contract in the
amount of $6.3 billion ($6,300,000,000.00) for the rights to
televise certain basketball performances of NCAA studentathletes, just 63 games annually. In 2000, ABC signed a
contract for $400 million ($400,000,000.00) for rights to
televise the football performances of NCAA studentathletes in the Bowl Championship Series . . . . Fox Sports
Network has agreed to pay $220 million ($220,000,000.00)
to televise the football performance of NCAA studentathletes in games involving the Big Twelve Conference
alone [(of which the University of Colorado is a member)].
. . . On June 12, 2002, the Wall Street Journal reported
that Coca-Cola Company entered an agreement with the
NCAA and CBS valued at $500 million ($500,000,000)
whereby Coca-Cola purchased the rights to promote its
products in connection with the performance of studentathletes at NCAA championship events.124
Moreover, “[u]niversities take commercial advantage of the
popularity of college athletics through the merchandising and

122

WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 796 (emphasis added).
See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 769.
124
Bloom’s Complaint ¶¶ 24–25 (citing Betsy McKay, Coke Beats Pepsi for NCAA
Rights in Deal That Tops $500 Million, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2002, at B3). See also
News Release, NCAA, NCAA Reaches Rights Agreement with CBS Sports (Nov. 18,
1999),
http://www.ncaa.org/releases/makepager.cgi/champother/1999111801co.htm;
News Release, NCAA, Coke Signs “Corporate Champion” Pact (June 24, 2002),
http://www.ncaa.org/news/2002/20020624/awide/3913n16.html.
123
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licensing of college merchandise.”125 While restricting an athlete’s
ability to grant commercial usage of his or her name and likeness,
“the NCAA does not restrict the use of a college athlete’s likeness
by the universities themselves.”126 Revenue generated from the
sales of college merchandise and royalties earned from the
licensing thereof produces multi-million dollar profits for schools.
In the early 1980s, the total retail market for products
identified with college athletics was under $100 million a
year, most of which was sold in college book stores or
other outlets on campus. By the mid-1990s, the college
market was over $2.5 billion a year, the vast bulk sold in
retail stores and chains. The average royalty rates of
around eight percent earned some 20 schools more than a
million dollars per year.127
The amateurism rules allow schools to profit by using athletes’
identities, but prohibit athletes from receiving any compensation
for their own name and likeness. The NCAA has considered
proposals to cure this inequity, though none would alleviate the
problems the Bylaws present to Bloom and other extraordinary
student-athletes like him.
Schools are able to capitalize on athletes’ identities, because
they can compete as NCAA athletes. Bylaw 14.01.3.1 states that
student-athletes must abide by the NCAA’s regulations to retain
their eligibility.128 Bylaw 12.5.1.1 grants universities permission
to commercially utilize a student-athlete’s name, likeness, and
identity.129 Thus, in order to abide by the NCAA rules and
regulations, an athlete must grant his or her school a license to use
his or her name and likeness (his or her right of publicity) for the
school’s own commercial gain. These provisions of the NCAA
contract are unconscionable and should be invalidated.
125

Vladimir P. Belo, The Shirts off Their Backs: Colleges Getting Away with Violating
the Right of Publicity, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 133, 153 (1996).
126
James S. Thompson, University Trading Cards: Do College Athletes Enjoy a
Common Law Right to Publicity?, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 143, 167 (1994) (citing a
letter to James S. Thompson from Richard D. Schultz, Executive Director of the NCAA).
127
WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 769.
128
NCAA, supra note 27, art. 14.01.3.1, at 125.
129
Id. at 78–79.
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B. Unconscionability
A court may invalidate a contract if it is deemed
unconscionable.130 Unconscionability exists within a contract
where its terms are so unfair that they “shock the conscience.”131
The traditional rule was that a contract was unconscionable if it
was “such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would
make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept
on the other.”132 In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,133
the court recognized that unconscionability included the absence of
a meaningful choice on the part of one party, coupled with
“contract terms [that] are unreasonably favorable to the other
party.”134 The court further noted that “when a party of little
bargaining power . . . signs a commercially unreasonable contract
with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his
consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was
ever given to all the terms.”135
Commentators have identified two different types of
unconscionability: procedural and substantive.136
Procedural
unconscionability results from unfairness within the bargaining
process.137 If one party to the contract effectively has no choice
but to agree to the terms of the contract, this indicates a defect in
the negotiation process, which may result in procedural
unconscionability.
Substantive unconscionability, however,
focuses on the terms of the contract itself. If the contract terms are
unreasonable, and so one-sided that they “shock the conscience,”
the contract may be substantively unconscionable.138
In order to participate in intercollegiate competition, an athlete
must agree to abide by all of the NCAA’s rules and regulations,
130

See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977) (allowing a court to refuse to enforce a contract, which it
deems was unconscionable when the contract was effectuated).
131
Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 2002).
132
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
133
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
134
Id. at 449.
135
Id.
136
CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
675 (4th ed. 1999).
137
Id.
138
Am. Software v. Ali, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 482 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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“including those which permit the universities to use the likeness
of college athletes for commercial purposes.”139 Athletes who
wish to compete at the collegiate level have no alternative but to
agree to the stipulated provisions, and as a result they are left with
“no meaningful choice.”140 High-school-aged athletes must either
agree to the terms, most of which they are likely unable to truly
understand, or loose their collegiate eligibility. In the end, these
young adults do not have a choice. Moreover, the contract terms
themselves are unjust. The forced forfeiture of rights combined
with the compulsory assignment of athletes’ right of publicity is
unconscionable and should be invalidated.
IV.

NCAA BYLAW 12.5 CONSTITUTES AN UNREASONABLE
RESTRAINT OF TRADE

A. The Sherman Antitrust Act
The Sherman Antitrust Act (hereinafter the “Act”)141 prohibits
unreasonable restraints of trade.142 The seminal case analyzing
NCAA practices under antitrust law is National Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.143 In
Board of Regents, the Supreme Court analyzed the NCAA’s
television plan and found that the “challenged practices of the
NCAA constitute a ‘restraint of trade’ in the sense that they limit
members’ freedom to negotiate and enter into their own television
contracts.”144 The Court recognized, however, that the Act only
prohibits those restraints of trade that are unreasonable.145

139

Thompson, supra note 126, at 176.
Walker, 35 F.2d at 450. See also WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 750 (“All
colleges with major athletic programs are members of the NCAA, and they have all
agreed to abide by the NCAA’s rules and not to play against any school the Association
declares ineligible.”).
141
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2000).
142
See id. “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or commerce among the
several states, or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal.” Id. § 1.
143
468 U.S. 85 (1984).
144
Id. at 98.
145
See id. at 98–99.
140
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A conclusion that a restraint of trade is unreasonable may
be “based either (1) on the nature or character of the
contracts, or (2) on surrounding circumstances giving rise
to the inference or presumption that they were intended to
restrain trade and enhance prices. Under either branch of
the test, the inquiry is confined to a consideration of the
impact on competitive conditions.”146
The validity of a regulation potentially restraining trade will be
determined by evaluating its impact on competition.147 Bylaw
12.5.1,148 the rule prohibiting athletes from associating with forprofit entities while allowing schools to profit from using their
athletes’ name, likeness, or identity, is anticompetitive and should
be invalidated under the Act.
A. Antitrust Scrutiny of the NCAA’s Amateurism Bylaws
Most courts examining a challenge to the NCAA’s Amateurism
Bylaws have determined that the Bylaws fulfill a legitimate
business purpose,149 and in fact have procompetitive effects.150
However, these cases have focused on the “no-agent” and “nodraft” rules.151 While it has been stated that “[t]he overriding
purpose of the eligibility Bylaws . . . is not to provide the NCAA
with commercial advantage, but rather the opposite extreme—to
prevent commercializing influences from destroying the unique
‘product’ of NCAA college football[,]”152 this rationale may not be
applicable when analyzing the amateurism rules from the

146

Id. at 103 (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690
(1978)).
147
See id.
148
NCAA, supra note 27, art. 12.5.1, at 78–81.
149
See, e.g., Gaines v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D.
Tenn. 1990) (stating that the NCAA’s regulations are designed to “maintain amateur
intercollegiate athletics ‘as an integral part of the educational program . . .’” (quoting
NCAA, supra note 14)).
150
See, e.g., id. at 746 (finding that the NCAA’s amateurism rules “have primarily
procompetitive effects in that they promote the integrity and quality of college football
and preserve the distinct ‘product’ of major college football as an amateur sport”).
151
See, e.g., Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
152
Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 744.
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viewpoint of their restrictions on athlete endorsements or
sponsorships.
1. College Athletics: Truly Amateur Sport?
College athletics is a commercialized industry. The NCAA’s
own efforts have demonstrated this with its multi-million dollar
television and merchandising contracts.153 To view collegiate
sports as “an institution of amateurism” would ignore this fact, and
would indeed be “misguided.”154 NCAA colleges and universities
reap tremendous financial benefits from their star athletes.155 A
star athlete may give the school increased name recognition,
greater airtime on television, and success for the school both on
and off the field. One star athlete could allow the school to enjoy
greater success in the sports season, which makes future
recruitment of other talented student-athletes easier. The increased
presence that accompanies a successful sports season can result in
an increase in applications, strengthening the quality of student the
school itself attracts.156 Most importantly, however, a star athlete
and/or a successful season greatly increases the revenue earned by
the school.
This phenomenon is best demonstrated by looking at a specific
example. In the past several years, the University of Maryland
(hereinafter “Maryland”), a large Division I school, has enjoyed
considerable athletic success.157 Coincidentally, the school has
also seen an increase in enrollment applications, a higher quality of
student, and an increase in revenue within that same time period.158

153

See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
Belo, supra note 125, at 153.
155
See generally supra Part III.B.
156
See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 796 (noting that in his four years at
Georgetown, Patrick Ewing helped generate a forty-seven percent increase in
applications and a forty point rise in its freshman SAT scores).
157
See infra Tables 1, 2.
158
See infra Tables 2, 3. But see Sarah Talalay, Football Success Pays Off for UM;
Campus Basks in Prestige, Enjoys Added Revenue, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Dec.
29, 2002, at 1A (quoting University of Maryland [hereinafter Maryland] officials who
asserted that donations fell in 2002 after years of continued growth and that the number
of applications received by Maryland had already been increasing prior to the success
within the Maryland athletic program).
154
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The following tables depict the evolution of Maryland’s
football and basketball teams, and track revenue and admission
statistic changes.
Table 1
University of Maryland Football and Basketball Season Records159
Football
School Year

Record

Basketball

Post-Season Result
(if any)

Record

Post-Season
Resulta (if any)

1998–1999

3-8

26-6

Sweet Sixteen

1999–2000

5-6

25-10

Second Round

2000–2001

5-6

25-11

Final Four

2001–2002

10-2

Orange Bowl

32-4

National Champions

a

These results indicate the NCAA Division I Basketball Tournament round in which
the Maryland men’s basketball team lost.

Table 2
University of Maryland Budgeted Sports-Related Revenue160
Fiscal
Year

Sales & Services of
Auxiliary Enterprisesa ($)

Private Gifts, Grants &
Contractsb ($)

1999

137,348,686

41,321,284

836,612,738

2000

127,720,172

43,222,186

904,347,659

2001

135,546,500

41,744,722

960,586,972

2002

151,388,065

54,687,507

1,028,517,530

159

Total Revenue
($)

See University of Maryland Football Game Results, TerrapinStats.com, at
http://www.terrapinstats.com/football.php (last visited Mar. 31, 2003); University of
Maryland Basketball Stats, Terrapin Stats.com, at http://www.terrapinstats.com/
basketball.php (last visited Mar. 31, 2003).
160
See Telephone Interview with Blene Mekbeb, Fiscal Management Specialist, Dept.
of Budget and Fiscal Analysis, University of Maryland (Jan. 28, 2003); Dept. of Budget
& Fiscal Analysis, Budget Information, University of Maryland, at
http://www.inform.umd.edu/CampusInfo/Departments/BFA/budgetinfo3.html
(last
visited Mar. 31, 2003).
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1,155,364,083

a

Auxiliary Enterprises revenue constituted 13–16% of the total revenue budgeted,
and includes the University Bookstore, where most of the school-licensed memorabilia is
sold on campus. Additional licensing revenue is also placed under this subsection.
b
Private Gifts comprised approximately 5% of the total revenue budgeted, and
consists mainly of donations made to the school, private grants, and alumni contributions.

Table 3
University of Maryland Admissions Data161
First Year
Classa

Total
Applications

Acceptance
Rate (%)

Average
GPAb

SAT Rangec

1999

18,807

54.5

3.61

1150–1320

2000

18,525

50.6

3.72

1170–1330

2001

19,668

55.0

3.76

1170–1330

2002

23,141

43.5

3.86

1200–1350

a

The year listed indicates year of matriculation.
Average high school grade point average.
c
Range of Scholastic Aptitude Test scores from the twenty-fifth to seventy-fifth
percentiles.
b

As of 1985, Maryland boasted a number-one-ranked football
team and a top-rated basketball team led by a young, upcoming
star, Len Bias.162 By 1990, however, commentators had criticized
Maryland as having hit “rock bottom.”163 Bias died of a cocaine
overdose in June of 1986, and following recruiting violations and
an NCAA determination of a “lack of institutional control,”
Maryland was subject to severe and controversial NCAA
sanctions.164 As a result, the Maryland men’s basketball team was
161
See Office of Institutional Research & Planning, Quick Summary Data, University of
Maryland, at http://www.inform.umd.edu/OIS/quicksum.html (last visited Mar. 31,
2003).
162
See Michael Wilbon, This Decision Has No Appeal, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1990, at
B1.
163
See, e.g., id.
164
See Jonathan Feigen, Restore The Roar; Maryland Revives Program With Help of
Home-Grown Talent, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 21, 1995, at 2 (describing sanctions
imposed on the program after the death of Len Bias and the programs subsequent
rebuilding process); Phil Hersh, ‘Seeing Superman Go Bad’: Their Records Set, for Many
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placed on probation for three years, was precluded from postseason
competition through the 1991–92 season, and was prohibited from
appearing on live television, effectively barring Maryland from
competing in the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) tournament
during those years.165 Furthermore, Maryland was required to
return $400,000 it had received in NCAA Division I Basketball
Tournament (hereinafter “Tournament”) revenue to the NCAA.
The NCAA deleted the Maryland men’s basketball team’s record
from the 1988 Tournament.166
From the 1999 to 2002 Maryland football seasons, the team
improved its overall record from an abominable 3-8 to a 10-2
record, including an appearance at Maryland’s first major bowl
game in over twenty years, followed by a win at the Peach Bowl in
2003.167 The Maryland Terrapins’ Peach Bowl win marked
Maryland’s second eleven-win season in the 110 years of
Maryland football.168
During the same time period, the basketball team dramatically
improved their record, made Maryland’s first appearance in the
NCAA National Tournament Final Four, and won Maryland’s first
national basketball championship.169 During the same period,
Maryland’s revenue increased a total of $318,751,345.170 In
particular, the categories of revenue representing sales of Maryland
memorabilia and licensing, and private donations increased a total

the Records Turned Criminal, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 28, 1986, at 1C; John Nelson, Year in
Review: 1986; Deaths of Bias, Rogers Overshadow Sport Achievements, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 1986, § 3, at 1.
165
See Maryland Nailed with a Two-Year Post-Season Ban, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 6,
1990, at B5.
166
See id.
167
See P.K. Daniel, Woman’s Touch on Terps; Title IX Paved Way for Maryland’s Yow,
String of Championship Seasons, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 17, 2002, at C1; Leo
Willingham, Peach Bowl: Maryland 30, Tennessee 3: Terps Right at Dome, ATLANTA J.CONST., at 1C; supra Table 1.
168
See College Game Day: Chick-Fil-A Peach Bowl: Fan Guide, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Dec. 31, 2002, at 5C.
169
See Dan Wetzel, Maryland Relishes First of Hopefully Many NCAA Titles, CBS
Sportsline, at http://cbs.sportsline.com/b/page/pressbox/0,1328,5192180,00.html (Apr. 2,
2002) (describing Maryland’s national championship and the program’s resurgence since
the death of Len Bias); supra Table 1.
170
See supra Table 2.
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of $10,004,293 and $11,481,954, respectively, between the 1999
and 2003 fiscal years.171
In that same period, the academic quality of the student body
improved correspondingly.172 Over the four years examined,
Maryland received increasingly more applications for the incoming
class. Admissions became increasingly competitive and the
percentage of accepted applications fell.173
The Maryland
admissions office received over 4,000 more applications for the
2002 entering class than it received for the 1999 entering class.174
Those students, on average, had high school GPAs that were a
quarter-point higher and scored an average of forty points higher
on their SATs.175
When examining these figures, it is important to note the
correlating time periods. The success of a football season would
likely be reflected in the following year’s revenue earnings and
admissions statistics.176 The basketball season, however, spans
two calendar years and ends early in the second year.177 Success
within a basketball season would be jointly represented in the
current and following fiscal years (i.e., the year in which the
season ended and the next year). Additionally, considering that
Maryland requires applicants for the incoming class to submit the
first portion of their application by the end of January, and all
accepted students must confirm their decision to attend the school
by May 1st, the basketball season would affect the following
year’s student-applications.178 For instance, the 2002 incoming
class would likely in part reflect the 2001 football team’s success,
but would not be affected by the 2001–02 basketball team’s
171

See supra Table 2.
See supra Table 3.
173
See supra Table 3.
174
See supra Table 3.
175
See supra Table 3.
176
The college football post-season traditionally ends by the first week of January. See,
e.g., University of Maryland, supra note 159 (demonstrating that the 2001–02 football
season schedule ended January 2, 2002).
177
See University of Maryland Football Game Results, supra note 159 (displaying the
2001–02 Basketball Season, which ran from November 2, 2001, through April 1, 2002).
178
See University of Maryland, Freshman Application Dates, Undergraduate
Admissions, at http://www.uga.umd.edu/apply/dates.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2003).
172
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national championship. Since Maryland won the championship
April 2002, it is likely that the 2003 incoming class will most
adequately reflect this athletic success.
Examination of these figures reveals a correlation between the
on-the-field success of a university’s teams and the benefits that
accrue to the school. The underlying purpose justifying the
NCAA’s rules—to promote amateur sport—may have already
been thwarted. Effectively, under the Amateurism Bylaws,
colleges and universities reap significant financial benefits from
their star student-athletes while the preventing student-athletes
from capitalizing on their own name and likeness.
2. Anti-Competitive Effects of the Amateurism Bylaws
Courts have rejected student-athletes’ antitrust claims on the
basis that the athlete is not a “competitor” with the NCAA or its
member institutions,179 but students and the NCAA or universities
might be viewed as competitors in terms of marketing or
sponsorship deals. If companies were permitted to sponsor
individual athletes, the college teams and the NCAA as a whole
would be competing with those individuals to gain lucrative
endorsement contracts. A star student-athlete might make a team
more attractive to marketers and to consumers, but if marketers
could simply invest in that star, they would potentially bypass
negotiating a deal with the university or the NCAA. For instance,
upon learning that Bloom was signing with the University of
Colorado, Nike, with whom Bloom had previously been
negotiating, stated “there was no reason for it to enter into a skiing
sponsorship contract with [Bloom] because the NCAA Bylaws
essentially made [him] a Nike athlete for the next four (4)
years.”180 In 1995, the University of Colorado entered into a
ground-breaking, five-year deal with Nike for $5.6 million,
renegotiated in 2000, under which all but two of the university’s
179

See, e.g., Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 978 F. Supp. 213, 217 (W.D. Pa.
1997) (“‘[T]he plaintiff is currently a student, not a businessman in the traditional sense,
and certainly not a ‘competitor’ within the contemplation of the antitrust laws.’” (quoting
Jones v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Ma. 1975))), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, and rev’d in part, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998).
180
Bloom’s Complaint ¶ 52.
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seventeen athletic teams would be outfitted in Nike attire and
equipment.181 These contracts are not limited to the University of
Colorado. Seven of the eight teams competing in the 2002 Bowl
Championship Series had agreements with Nike.182 In the 2002
NCAA Basketball Tournament, forty-nine of the sixty-five
competing schools were “Nike schools,” including all four teams
competing in the Final Four.183
If the NCAA’s rules had not prevented Bloom from entering
into a Nike (or similar) contract, then Bloom could compete with
the University of Colorado or the NCAA for corporate
sponsorship. The NCAA’s rules are, therefore, anticompetitive by
ensuring that universities do not have to compete with their own
athletes for advertising and merchandising monies. Given that the
NCAA has abandoned amateurism (as demonstrated by the
University of Maryland) and that it has thwarted competition
within the sports sponsorship and endorsement market, the only
consequence is that the NCAA Bylaws have no legitimate purpose
and have anticompetitive effects. Therefore, the rules are an
unreasonable restraint of trade and should be invalidated for
violating the Sherman Antitrust Act.184 As such, the rules may be

181

See Adam Thompson, Clotheslined CU Figures to Take a Hit Even if the Big 12
School Renews Its Lucrative Nike Contract, Which Expires This Weekend, DENVER POST,
June 26, 2001, at D1.
182
See id.
183
Mike Huguenin, Now You Seed Them? No, You Don’t, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB.,
Mar. 30, 2002, at C2 (noting that most of the remaining teams had agreements with
Adidas, Reebok, and And 1).
184
See Michael P. Acain, Revenue Sharing: A Simple Cure for the Exploitation of
College Athletes, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 307, 327 (1998).
[A] student-athlete may convince a court that Rule 15.2 is invalid by showing
that it is not connected to the legitimate goals of the NCAA. Such a challenge
would seek to establish that the NCAA has abandoned the goal of combining
education with athletics . . . . Without a connection to legitimate goals, the
NCAA’s entire regulatory program fits a pattern of purely anti-competitive
behavior, and should be invalidated as a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Additionally, if a student-athlete can prove that the NCAA’s rules are aimed at
maximizing profits, and not at upholding traditional goals, an argument can be
made that these restrictions should be treated and rejected as regulations within
a purely commercial market.
Id.
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deemed an unreasonable restraint of trade and should be
invalidated for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act.
V.

MODIFICATIONS TO THE AMATEURISM BYLAWS

A. Amateurism Deregulation
If the Amateurism Bylaws were invalidated, amateurism may
survive, albeit under different circumstances. There have been a
plethora of proposals suggested by outside media sources, as well
as the NCAA itself, ranging from modifying the NCAA
amateurism rules to abolishing them entirely. For instance, Tom
Farrey, an ESPN.com writer, proposed providing players with
outright payments through a form of revenue-sharing to allow the
student-athlete to be compensated based on the earnings they
provide for their individual schools.185 Farrey notes, “Over a fouryear college athletic career, that means the average Syracuse player
is theoretically ‘underpaid’ by more then $1.8 million.”186 This is,
however, too far-reaching a proposition. The goal of collegiate
amateur sports should not be abandoned altogether. Paying
athletes for their participation in their “collegiate” amateur sport,
as opposed to another sport in which they compete professionally,
might create more problems than it solves.
The NCAA itself has considered numerous proposals to modify
its amateurism rules. The Amateurism Deregulation Proposals
were adopted by the Division II schools, and were considered, but
largely rejected by Division I.187 These proposals take two forms:
post-enrollment and pre-enrollment.188
The pre-enrollment
185

See Tom Farrey, Play-for-Pay: Not Yet, but Soon?, ESPN, at http://espn.go.com/
ncb/ncaatourney01/s/2001/0326/1162258.html (Mar. 28, 2001).
186
Id.
187
See Adam Wodon, D-II Passes Amateurism Deregulation; D-I Next?, USCHO, at
http://uscollegehockey.com/news/2001/01/09_001551.php (Jan. 9, 2001); NCAA,
Division I Management Council, at http://www1.ncaa.org/membership/governance/
division_I/management_council/index.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2003).
188
NCAA,
Postenrollment
Amateurism
Deregulation
Proposals,
at
http://www12.ncaa.org/membership/governance/division_I/docs/board_of_dirs/2001_08_
Board_of_Directors/07_Att_B_2001_08_BOd_Amateurism.htm
(July
11,
2001)
[hereinafter Post-enrollment Proposals]; NCAA, Pre-Enrollment Amateurism
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proposals are inapplicable to Bloom’s case because, while he
engaged in professional athletics prior to competing as a collegiate
athlete, the debate centers around his ongoing marketing activities
while he is enrolled in the University of Colorado. Postenrollment proposals include allowing the NCAA to pay insurance
premiums on behalf of student-athletes who qualify for disability
insurance; for student-athletes to obtain a loan for up to $20,000
during their five-year eligibility period based on future earnings;
and a fee-for-lesson provision, allowing student-athletes to accept
up to $2,000 in compensation for teaching their athletic skills to
others.189
These proposals, even if they had been enacted, would not have
enabled Bloom to reasonably continue his skiing career. His
concern is not based on disability insurance; he needs funding to
support his elite skiing. Likewise, the fee-for-lesson provision is
of minimal assistance, because even if Bloom earned up to the
$2,000 cap, this would do little to dent the debt he would incur
participating in elite ski competition.190 Lastly, the loan based on
future earnings does not allow Bloom to earn all of the money
necessary for him to continue competing. Even if this limitation
was raised, however, it would be of little assistance to Bloom
based on the structure of elite skiing. He needs endorsement
money to cover his skiing costs. This is, and will be, the case for
as long as he competes in the sport. A loan against future earnings
would not rectify Bloom’s situation because those endorsements
will be needed to pay for that current year’s skiing. Perhaps no
general proposals could alleviate his predicament, but in light of
the perpetual problems the Amateurism Rules create, the NCAA
should be vigilant to accommodate these student-athletes whose
talents separate them from the “average” athlete.
As this Note demonstrates, the current system results in several
injustices to student-athletes. Modifications to the current bylaws
could be made that would protect the most talented student-athletes
Deregulation Proposals, at http://www12.ncaa.org/membership/governance/division_I/
docs/board_of_dirs/2001_08_Board_of_Directors/07_Att_A_200108_BOD_Amateurism
.htm (July 11, 2001) [hereinafter Pre-enrollment Proposals].
189
Post-enrollment Proposals, supra note 188.
190
See King, supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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from being exploited by their own colleges or universities while
preserving amateurism. Accommodations could be made that
would be fairer to the athlete and would not result in unjust
enrichment of the school.
A. Proposed Solutions
It has been suggested that the NCAA establish a trust fund
system similar to that instituted by the United States Olympic
Committee (USOC).191 USOC regulations permit athletes to retain
their amateur status, while still allowing the athlete to receive
monetary compensation granted by the committee.192 The program
allows such funds to be collected into a trust fund, from which the
athlete may withdraw to cover her sport-related expenses.193 The
remainder may be withdrawn once she has completed her amateur
career.194 Such a system would alleviate some of the amateurism
rules’ inherent unfairness. In Bloom’s situation, the money could
be deposited into a trust fund to support his ski endeavors.
Meanwhile, such a system would ensure that other athletes could
not simply profit. To ensure that student-athletes are not abusing
this system, each student’s trust account should be supervised by
an NCAA-appointed (and student-athlete-approved) trustee. The
trustee could withdraw the money for activities determined to be
“appropriate.” This determination could be made at the outset,
when the trust account is first established, and would be the result
of a negotiation between the NCAA and the individual studentathlete or the student’s university. Whether a student-athlete’s
usage of his or her funds is appropriate should be a case-by-case
determination, accounting for the specific circumstances unique to
each individual student-athlete. The standards set forth in this
negotiation should be put into writing and a dispute resolution
process should also be agreed upon to ensure a fair process for the
191

See Belo, supra note 125, at 154.
See id.; Christine Brennan, No Small Change for USOC; Budget Burgeons, Attitude
Shifts, but Pennies Can Pinch Athletes; No Small Change for Olympics, yet Pennies Can
Pinch Athletes, WASH. POST, May 12, 1996, at D01 (describing Operation Gold, “which
pays athletes for medals won at the Olympics and world championships, a reward system
instituted for the first time in 1980, and beefed up considerably in 1989”).
193
See Belo, supra note 125, at 154.
194
See id.
192
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determination of expenditures that may or may not have been
foreseeable at the time the account was created.
Another solution for athletes whose secondary “professional”
sport is regulated by the USOC and/or the relevant national
governing body (NGB), would be to adopt an exception similar to
that carved out by the NCAA in its Olympic Gold Grant
program.195 Specifically, the NCAA allows former Olympians to
retain their collegiate amateur status while receiving funds
administered by the USOC.196 Under the Olympic Gold Grant
program, “a student-athlete remains an ‘amateur’ completely
eligible to play college sports after being directly paid $25,000 in
cash in exchange for each Olympic gold-medal winning
performance. The Operation Gold program also permits sizable
cash payments to ‘amateurs’ for silver and bronze medal
performances.”197 There is no logical justification for why an
athlete may be permitted to receive money as a reward for their
Olympic performance, yet not be able to receive the necessary
funding to compete and train in Olympic and elite-caliber
competition. A fair compromise may be to have the endorsement
money flow through the USOC and/or the relevant NGB (e.g., U.S.
Skiing), as an agent for the athlete. The money could then be paid
by the USOC to cover training and equipment costs. In a sense,
this would assign the USOC a trustee-like position, protecting the
money on behalf of the athlete, while ensuring that the money is
being allocated for “appropriate” expenditures.
The NCAA’s aforementioned proposal to grant student-athletes
a loan based upon their future earnings,198 while not alleviating
Bloom’s financial burdens, might be effectively modified to
provide a reasonable solution to Bloom’s problem. First, the limit
of the loan should be individualized to the particular studentathlete, and not be based upon an arbitrary number.199 After an
examination of the surrounding circumstances, including the
student’s needs and intended use of the money, a limit could be
195
196
197
198
199

See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
See NCAA, supra note 27, art. 12.1.1.1.4.3.2, at 71.
Bloom’s Complaint ¶ 32.
See Post-enrollment Proposal, supra note 188.
See id. The post-enrollment proposal amount is $20,000.
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agreed upon by the NCAA, the pertinent member-institution, and
the student-athlete. Again, it is imperative that this be a case-bycase determination rather than a per se rule. Problems arise in the
current regime because of the amateurism rules’ rigidity and their
inflexibility towards those student-athletes that do not fit neatly
into the box of standard, average collegiate athletes.
Second, a necessary modification to the current proposal would
alter the loan’s dependency on future earnings.200 For reasons
previously described, a loan on future earnings may not be a
reasonable solution for athletes such as Bloom. A better solution
would be to allow student-athletes to receive traditional loans that
would cover the necessary costs and expenditures, i.e., those costs
that the endorsements would have previously paid. The studentathlete could then repay these loans on an installment basis and be
liable as a traditional creditor would be. The best case scenario
would be for the NCAA to grant these loans upon a demonstration
of need and possibly a demonstration that this money was available
from other venues that the NCAA’s rules have denied the studentathlete. This would enable the NCAA to regulate who is receiving
the loans and how the monies are being used, and it would also
allow the students to receive the loan at a more desirable interest
rate than a college student would likely otherwise be able to obtain.
The amount of money loaned should be based upon the studentathlete’s need in proportion to the forfeited opportunities, and not a
literal evaluation of future earnings.
CONCLUSION
The NCAA’s rules prohibiting Jeremy Bloom from retaining
the ski-related endorsements necessary to continue in elite
competition should be invalidated under numerous legal theories.
Even if the rules themselves could be saved by virtue of the fact
that they support the NCAA’s stated purpose of furthering
amateurism, an exception should be made in Bloom’s case. The
opportunities presented to Bloom had nothing to do with his
collegiate football career and arrangements could have been made
200

See id.
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to accommodate the needs of this talented student-athlete.
Examination of the facts of Bloom’s case reveals that a prohibition
here does nothing to further the NCAA’s goals, but only serves to
injure Bloom and student-athletes like him. For an association that
exists by virtue of student-athletes, and is designed to protect these
individuals, this outcome is unreasonable and wrong.

